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Abstract – Even though the efforts to contribute to 
and sustain the Global Earth Observation System of 
Systems (GEOSS) are voluntary, the derived benefits 
will be enjoyed by contributors and non-contributors 
alike. Thus, GEOSS can be classified as a public good, 
whose provision is prone to “free-riding”. We analyze 
the benefits of participating in GEO (Group on Earth 
Observation) and GEOSS as well as the potential 
problems arising from voluntary contribution to 
GEOSS. We survey economic and game theoretic 
literature to see what type of problems, related to the 
provision of public goods, are described. Secondly, we 
conduct a survey among individuals involved in 
various GEOSS tasks, to find out about their 
perception, benefits and problems regarding GEO 
and GEOSS. First results show that benefits from 
participating in GEO include improved networking 
opportunities and visibility for work. Overall, 
contribution to GEOSS was perceived as rather low 
and lacking financial support was regarded as 
impediment.  
 
Keywords: GEOSS, public good, game theory, user 
survey.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
GEOSS is coordinated and administered by GEO. 1GEO 
has established a ten-year implementation plan for the 
period 2005-2015 which outlines the vision, purpose and 
expected benefits of GEOSS. The implementation plan 
clearly states that “societal benefits of Earth observations 
cannot be achieved without data sharing” (GEOSS Data 
Sharing Action Plan 2010).  
However, cooperation in Earth observation data, and thus 
also in GEOSS, faces various challenges: Earth 
observation has a history of restriction due to matters of 
national security and sovereignty; many countries lack 
consistent political and fiscal support to engage in 
cooperative space projects; or there exist incompatible 
data access and pricing policy among satellite programs 
and types (Thomas et al. 1995). Also the question of 
funding and financial commitments towards GEOSS, 
which is necessary to ensure long-lasting collaborative 
efforts, remains important (Macauley 2005). 
Additionally, GEOSS is a “system of systems” and the 
challenges concerning the technical compatibility of the 
systems and the establishment of technological standards 
can occur.  
As contribution to GEOSS is voluntary, but benefits are 
enjoyed by contributors and non-contributors alike, 
GEOSS exhibits similarities with public good. Public 
goods are characterized by non-rivalry, - implying that an 
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agent’s consumption does not happen at the expense of 
another agent’s consumption; and non-excludability,- no 
agent can be excluded from consuming the good. Since 
contributors and non-contributors equally benefit from 
the public good, they often do not have sufficient 
incentives to provide the good and rather “free-ride” on 
the efforts of others. GEOSS can be understood as public 
good in two ways: (i) GEOSS shall be made accessible 
freely or at a very low cost and non-contributors cannot 
be excluded from using it. (ii) On the basis of Earth 
observation data, environmental policies and decisions, - 
or decisions in the name of the public interest (Smith and 
Doldirina 2008), are realized. When data and products 
provided by GEOSS are used to improve the state of the 
environment, no one can be excluded from the accrued 
environmental benefits.  
This gives rise to following questions: 
• If contribution to GEOSS is voluntary, what are 
the consequences for the provision of GEOSS?  
• What could be the implications of insufficient 
information exchange between GEOSS 
participants? What is suggested in the literature 
to overcome this problem? 
• How can technological/data standards emerge 
in a self-organizing process and in the absence 
of a binding data sharing agreement. What are 
the chances for a suboptimal standard to 
remain?  
To answer these questions we firstly have consulted 
economic and game theoretic literature. Based on these 
findings we have established a questionnaire and 
distributed it among individuals which are currently 
involved in various GEOSS tasks. Our aim was to find 
out how challenges and benefits, which we have 
previously been identified in the literature, are perceived 
by the stakeholders involved.  
The survey was called “Identifying challenges in the 
provision of GEOSS” and was distributed as online 
questionnaire and as hard copy during the period May 
2010-September 2010. The questionnaire has undergone 
stringent and fruitful review from several experts 
involved in GEO. Finally, it included multiple choice 
questions, but also a range of open questions to avoid 
narrowing down the spectrum of possible answers. The 
distribution was supported by all Sub-Benefit Area 
leaders, which was essential for the success of the survey 
and for which we are very grateful.  
We have received 80 completed responses from 
individuals participating in all GEOSS Sub-Benefit 
Areas, as well as individuals from the overarching tasks 
GEOSS Common Infrastructure and Data Management, 
and the Architecture and Data Committee, Science and 
Technology Committee and Capacity Building 
Committee. This broad spectrum of responses does not 
enable us to identify specific problems and challenges, or 
evaluate the performance of GEOSS in a specific area, 
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but gives us general idea about the current perception of 
GEO and GEOSS.  
In the next sections we will pick up our three leading 
questions, introduce results from the literature and 
present first results of our survey.  
 
1. CHALLENGES IN THE PROVISION OF 
GEOSS 
 
1.1.  Voluntary participation to provide a public 
good 
The GEOSS process is exemplary for the difficult 
provision of a public good: Contribution to GEOSS is 
non-binding. The GEOSS tasks and their members, 
which provide the GEOSSs’ components, are self-
organizing and self- financing units. In achieving their 
goals, the GEO secretariat plays a facilitating role but 
does not offer any financial support. The question 
emerges how committed contribution to GEOSS can be 
ensured.  
A broadly used example for the provision of public goods 
is the establishment of an International Environmental 
Agreement (IEA). Similar to GEOSS, no country can be 
forced to sign an IEA, and if it does, can withdraw from 
the agreement at any time. Barrett (1994) suggests that 
there exists a tradeoff between the breadth and depths of 
an agreement: There is a high degree of cooperation 
when the net benefits between full cooperative and non-
cooperative outcome are small. Even though literature 
suggests that the socially optimal size of participation to 
an agreement on a public good is high degree/full 
cooperation, self-organized cooperation can only induce 
low participation. 
However, an external institution, even with little or no 
enforcement powers, can help to strategically frame a 
situation such that cooperation is mutually desirable. This 
includes revealing situations where most benefits can be 
achieved;  by influencing the issues which are negotiated, 
or by  the modification of accession and abrogation rules 
(e.g. Carraro and Marchiori 2003, Carraro and Siniscalco 
1995, Yi 2003, Yi and Shin 2000); linkage of 
negotiations (e.g. Carraro and Marchiori 2003, Carraro 
and Siniscalco 1995); or side payments (e.g. Carraro and 
Marchiori 2003); proposal to establish multiple 
agreements at a time, i.e. various agreements according to 
the specific interests or financial endowments of agents 
(e.g. Finus and Rundshagen 2003, Yi and Shin 2000). An 
external coordinating institution, such as the GEO 
secretariat, is crucial to successfully achieve the goals of 
cooperation. The self-reliant establishment of mutually 
profitable contracts has not proven effective in sustaining 
cooperation among a large number of agents. On the 
other extreme, an external institution trying to establish a 
binding agreement could fail in doing so because it lacks 
information about the agents to design an effective 
agreement.  
Table A. presents some of the benefits which respondents 
perceive resulting from their participation in GEO. These 
can as well be understood as incentives, enabled by the 
GEO secretariat, to engage in further collaboration.  
These incentives seem not sufficient to achieve more 
collaboration: Around 50% of respondents perceived 
contribution to GEOSS as too little. 34 of the 80 
respondents give suggestions on how contribution to 
GEOSS could be increased. The most successful 
measures were perceived to be financial support (29%), 
or proofing the success of GEOSS’ concept (21%). 
 
Table A. Benefits derived from the cooperation in GEO 
perceived by the respondents of our questionnaire (N = 
80, results are given in %) 
 
Degree of 
agreement:  
Very 
much 
2 3 4 Very 
little 
No 
answer  
Political 
support for 
your work  
11 31 29 14 6 9 
Increased 
visibility for 
your work  
16 50 16 10 3 5 
Improved 
network 
opportunities  
35 38 14 9 3 3 
 
 
1.2. Informational constraints 
In the past, unawareness among the participants in 
GEOSS about each others’ research and contributions has 
been observed. Accordingly, our study reveals that ~ 
41% of respondents perceive that the degree of 
interaction within the respective tasks is rather low.   
Are the current reporting mechanisms from the tasks to 
the GEO secretariat, but also from the GEO secretariat to 
the public sufficiently established? Akerlof (1970) 
depicts the collapse of a market as consequence of 
informational asymmetries: buyers lack information 
about the state of the assets offered in the market, high 
quality assets and assets of lower quality sell at the same 
price. Low quality assets bring down the average price 
and drive the high quality assets out of the market. This 
explains, what is already intuitive: that lacking 
information in cooperation for GEOSS can lead to lower 
than possible outcome. Overgaard (1991) adds that by 
repeated interaction low quality assets or characteristics 
can be weeded out of the market, which seems to be a 
positive prospect for long-lasting cooperation to provide 
GEOSS. At this stage, a coordinating institution such as 
the GEO secretariat can provide incentives to foster and 
monitor communication.  
Around 41% of respondents perceive that there is too 
little interaction within the tasks, whereas 15% find that 
very much interaction happens within the task. Suggested 
activities such as funding projects, or funding the 
participation in meetings and workshops were named as 
possible solution to this problem.  
 
1.3. Standard setting and the role of a 
technological leader  
GEOSS is a ‘system of systems’ where technical 
standardization and interoperability of the components 
has to be ensured: how can standards emerge in a self-
organizing process?  
Interoperability and data compatibility clearly yields 
increased benefits,- or network effects, for all 
participants. Similar to the provision of a public good, 
benefit increase when the size of the network increases. 
However, there are reasons for not being the first to 
engage in the creation of a standard or network. Bliss and 
Nalebuff (1984) or Melissas (2005) show how agents 
delay the private provision of a public good, hoping that 
others will undertake these steps first; because pioneering 
entry results in immediate losses to the entrant until other 
agents join the network as well. These economic concepts 
suggest that the first-mover bears additional costs and 
therefore refrains from exerting effort. Hence, standard 
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setting in GEOSS could encounter difficulties or be 
delayed.  
Out of the 80 respondents, 42 told us about their 
expectations of GEOSS and whether these were realized.  
Out of these, 41% named data sharing and the 
development and coordination of common data standards 
as main expectations. However, it was perceived that 
much of this activity was not yet realized and there was 
too little coordination of the data. However, the responses 
were considerably optimistic about the success of future 
efforts.   
 
2. CONCLUSION 
This analysis focused on the potential benefits and 
problems arising from the voluntary nature of GEOSS. 
We focus on economic and game theoretic literature and 
present first results of a qualitative survey targeting 
contributors to GEOSS-tasks from all Sub-benefit Areas 
and some Committees.  
The leading questions discussed here are by far not 
exhaustive and do not cover the complexity of the 
GEOSS process. From the literature we find that most 
processes concerning the provision of a public good 
demand an external institution as coordinator, which sets 
incentives to achieve the respective goal. Similarly, 
asymmetrically distributed information and insufficient 
communication can be a major barrier to the 
establishment of GEOSS. In the same vein, optimal 
standard setting and achieving interoperability can be 
jeopardized without guidance of an external institution.  
The GEO secretariat fulfills this role by providing 
guidance for the GEOSS components, establishing a 
framework for cooperation and providing political 
approval for the tasks. The respondents of our survey 
state clearly that participating in GEO increases the 
visibility of their work, offers political support and 
provides valuable networking opportunities. However, 
apart from these benefits, the main expectations were the 
provision of a data sharing regime, which has not yet 
been realized, but is progressing as desired. However, 
contribution to GEOSS is seen as too little, also the 
degree of interaction between the GEOSS’ participants is 
seen as too low. Both of these problems are suggested to 
be resolved by means of providing funding for activities 
related to GEOSS. If not for the projects to attract non-
contributors to the GEOSS process, than funding for 
meetings could at least increase communication and 
consequently progress within the tasks.  
However, to accomplish a sustainable use of GEOSS, 
also a timely integration of user communities in the 
design, implementation and utilization of GEOSS is 
necessary. The dimension and necessity of user 
integration has so far been neglected in our study, but 
will be vital to ensure the sustainability of GEOSS  past 
2015.  
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